Convergence of social protection objectives and policies in member states is an explicit objective of the EU. Earlier research has shown that there has indeed been a tendency of convergence of social protection levels over the last decades. However, comparative studies frequently use indicators which may not be representative as measures of the welfare state. In this article we have done several convergence tests with the most recent data, using a variety of indicators of social protection: social expenditures, both at the macro and at the programme level, replacement rates of unemployment and social assistance benefits and poverty indicators. Together, these indicators provide a broader picture of the evolution of social protection. Our results are less clear cut than earlier findings. We still find convergence of social expenditure in EU countries over a longer period. However, this trend seems to have stagnated in recent years. The evidence is mixed for the other indicators. Replacement rates of unemployment benefits converged to a higher level, but social assistance benefits did not. Poverty rates and poverty gaps have converged since the mid-1980s, but the levels of both indicators have developed in the opposite direction.
INTRODUCTION 1
Social progress has been a European objective since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The founding fathers of the EU believed that economic integration would promote progress in social protection across participating countries, such that convergence of social protection systems would follow more or less spontaneously. However, the welfare state literature indicates that economic integration may also be harmful to social protection systems. Fears for a social race to the bottom have been expressed. In the 1990s both the European Council and the European Commission adopted a more active convergence strategy: they proclaimed the objective of a convergence of social policies of member states and the development of common objectives of social policies. In 2000 the European Council adopted the goal that besides economic growth, social cohesion should also be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). The open method of coordination was introduced as the means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals. Social indicators were developed to monitor the improvements with respect to the social cohesion. This Lisbon Agenda has renewed the interest in patterns of social protection across member states. Thus, Europeanization may contribute to social convergence. In this article we will test the convergence hypothesis. Earlier research has shown that there has been a tendency towards rather strong convergence of social protection systems in the EU countries over the last decades (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002) . However, the indicators used in earlier studies -mostly public expenditure on social benefits -may not be representative for the social security system at large. Indeed, there are several problems. Expenditure ratio's are determined to some extent by unemployment rates and by the demographic structure in a country and thus do not fully reflect protection levels. Also, most analyses of social protection are focused on public arrangements only. But social effort is not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes for public programmes (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2005) . Also, differences in the tax treatment of social benefits make international comparisons of social protection systems much more difficult. The OECD did a comprehensive study on social expenditure, in which they account for private social benefits and the impact of the tax system on social expenditure (Adema, 2001; Adema and Ladaique, 2005) . But adjusted aggregate expenditure data can only provide a rough indication of the degree of social protection offered by different welfare states. More indicators, also at the programme level or at the microlevel are necessary to make an adequate comparison across countries and to test the social convergence hypothesis.
In this article we will do several convergence tests using recent data on social protection. To that end we use a variety of social indicators: (a) at the macro level: total public social expenditure and total public and private social expenditure (accounting for the impact of private arrangements and for the impact of the tax system); (b) at the programme level: expenditures on various social programmes, including old age, disability, unemployment, health, family, active labor market programmes and various other social policy areas; and (c) at the individual level: replacement rates of unemployment benefits, minimum social assistance levels and poverty rates after social transfers. This poverty rate is an official EU social cohesion indicator.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss the Europeanization of social policies and the hypothesis of social convergence. In section 2.3 we introduce and discuss the welfare state indicators used, the data and the σ and β convergence tests. Section 2.4 presents the results of several crosscountry analyses. Section 2.5 concludes the article.
THE CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS

Effects of economic integration
Should we expect social convergence in the EU? Theoretically, convergence of social protection may occur both as a consequence of European economic integration and more in particular the creation of a single market, and as a consequence of the implementation of EU social policies (Leibfried, 2000) . In this section we discuss the effects of economic integration. The traditional opinion -already expressed by the founding fathers of the EU -is that economic integration promotes progress in social protection across participating countries, such that convergence of social protection systems follows more or less spontaneously. Theoretically, however, economic integration can be both beneficial and harmful to social protection systems. On the one hand, it can be argued that economic integration leads to more economic development in relatively poor countries and economic development in turn strengthens the need for an extended system of social protection as well as the opportunity to fund it (Goudswaard and Van Riel, 2004) . To insure themselves against the increased dynamics of the labor market due to international economic integration, people desire higher levels of social protection (Agell, 1999: 154) . On the other hand, internationalization goes along with higher mobility of production factors. An increase in migration can cause adverse selection problems: individuals who expect to be net beneficiaries will be attracted to countries with generous social programmes, while net contributors are deterred by the high tax burden in these countries. This puts pressure on the generosity of social security systems, because the social expenditures rise and the tax base narrows (Sandmo, 2001 ). In the end, this results in convergence to lower social protection levels (Sinn, 2002) . This is a standard argument for centralizing redistribution policies in an economic union, although it can be demonstrated that centralization is not an inevitable consequence (Wildasin, 1991) . A second argument says that the competitive position of countries with relatively generous protection systems may be damaged through higher labour costs, especially in a single market (Sinn, 2003) . Consequently, competition leads to lower standards of social policies, the so-called 'social race to the bottom' or 'social dumping' (Scharpf, 1999) . This effect could even be strengthened by the fact that because of the EMU criteria, countries can only increase their competitiveness with supply-side strategies (Scharpf, 2002: 649) . As a consequence, again social protection may converge to lower levels. At the national level, the indirect effects of European economic integration can be explained by changing domestic opportunity structures. According to this mechanism of Europeanization, domestic policies are not affected by prescriptive EU requirements, but by redistribution of powers and resources between domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002) . This shift in national political arenas may eventually lead to policy changes. The pressure on labour costs due to international competition may limit certain actors to bargain on expansions of social protection, while it may provide actors who are in favour of retrenchments with more political power.
From the above discussion it can be concluded that theory does not tell us clearly whether economic integration leads to more or less social protection and whether there will be spontaneous convergence of social protection systems.
Europeanization
What is the role of EU policies as far as social convergence is concerned? In the literature, several authors have pointed out that Europeanization and convergence are not interchangeable concepts (Graziano and Vink, 2007) . Whereas Europeanization can generally be regarded as domestic change caused by European integration (Vink, 2003: 63) , convergence refers to a decrease in variation across countries over time. Hence, convergence can occur as a result of Europeanization (Radaelli, 2000) , but Europeanization could lead to continuing divergence as well and it is therefore an empirical question whether Europeanization leads to convergence.
In principle, member states of the EU are still autonomous when it comes to the design and generosity of their social protection systems. Still, member states have accepted a certain degree of commitment in terms of social protection. This commitment is embodied in two recommendations accepted by the European Council in 1992. The first recommendation, of June 1992, dealt with common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social assistance in social protection systems (92/441/EEC). The second recommendation, of July 1992, explicitly addressed the 'convergence of social protection objectives and policies' (92/442/EEC). The motivation was that convergence seeks to guarantee the continuation and stimulate the development of social protection within the context of the completion of the internal market. And also that member states face common problems, such as ageing of the population, unemployment, changing family structures and poverty; common objectives must act as pointers to the way social protection systems are modified to take account of these problems. The desirability of convergence of member states' policies has been reconfirmed in several reports of the European Commission, such as the White Paper on European Social Policy of 1994 (Commission, 1994) and reports on Social Protection in Europe. The 1998 Employment Guidelines, as a result of the Jobs Summit in Luxembourg at the end of 1997, can partly be seen as an implementation of the convergence strategy.
A new and important step was taken at the European Council in Lisbon 2000. For the EU the strategic goal was set for the decade ending in 2010 to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy with sustainable economic growth and greater social cohesion. To achieve these aims, the social model needs to be modernized. To ensure long-term sustainability of the social security systems in the light of the ageing process, participation rates should be increased.
The Treaty of Nice of 2001 took the social agenda forward. It was agreed to advance social policy on the basis of the open method of coordination (OMC), first employed with respect to employment policies. The method recognizes that social policy remains the responsibility of member states, under the principle of subsidiarity. It implies that member states define and evaluate common objectives and learn from each other how to best reach these objectives. Best practices are disseminated and benchmarking is used. Coordination is based on evaluation and peer pressure, but does not offer the option of sanctions. In Nice it was decided that member states should implement action plans for combating poverty and social exclusion and to define common objectives on social indicators. The indicators encompass financial poverty, income inequality, long-term unemployment, regional variation in employment rates, life expectancy and poor health.
Some consider these common indicators and the national action plans for social inclusion as significant progress towards integration along the social dimension (Atkinson, 2002) . Others question this form of coordination (Leibfried, 2002) .
Because of the non-binding character, the impact of this new mode of governance on national policies is highly debated in the literature (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005; Kvist and Saari, 2007b) . Instead of Europeanization based on institutional compliance (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002) , the structural coupling between the European and national level brought about by the OMC relies on other mechanisms. Firstly, the OMC may have a normative influence on national policies. Objectives are normatively formulated and targets are defined. In addition, guidelines provide specific policy norms, stating that member states should focus more on certain policies. To enforce these guidelines, member states receive comments and recommendations from Commission services annually on the progression in their policies regarding the guidelines and objectives. By means of these norms, the OMC diffuses a paradigm of activation and inclusion through the member states, aimed at influencing the domestic policy-making arena's.
A second Europeanization mechanism effected by the OMC is mutual learning. In the peer review programme, an institutionalized setting of policy learning, country representatives learn from the experiences of their international peers. Policies regarded as best practices will be imitated by policymakers, called policy mimicking. Recently, Heidenreich and Bischoff (2008: 516) even argued that this cognitive dimension is the prevailing influencing mechanism of the OMC.
Although the differences in social protection systems across countries are explicitly taken into account in the OMC, this new mode of governance can certainly be expected to trigger convergence in social policies across the member states. Following the idea of 'contextualized learning', the OMC does not prescribe specific policy instruments, leaving room for countries to opt for policy instruments that suit their domestic situations best. Therefore the OMC will not lead to convergence in specific policy instruments, but as policymakers get influenced by the normative and cognitive mechanisms of the OMC, policy areas may shift towards a certain direction, leading to a form of convergence in the end. At least, this new mode of governance and the Lisbon agenda in general, have renewed the debate on convergence patterns across EU member states.
In line with the discussion above, we hypothesize that Europeanisation has led to convergence of social protection systems across European countries. This social convergence hypothesis we develop here has two components. Firstly, we expect the dispersion across countries to decrease over time, leading to convergence. The second component is the direction of convergence. As a consequence of the policy initiatives at the European level, we expect convergence of social protection and social inclusion at least to the middle, or to higher levels.
Earlier findings
Over the past decades the attention for analysing convergence of social expenditures has grown steadily. Early scholars as Wilensky (1975) show that from the 1950s social expenditures have grown in rich countries. The hypothesis is that due to similar developments such as industrialization and economic growth public expenditures on welfare of modern societies will converge. Montanari (2001: 470) called this the 'old convergence' hypothesis. O'Connor's (1988) study, however, does not confirm this old convergence hypo-thesis empirically. She concludes that there is minimal convergence in social transfers and social expenditures among 17 countries in the period .
From the mid-1990s, the central argument is that globalisation and Europeanisation led to a downward convergence of social expenditures. This argument is what Montanari (2001: 470) called the 'new convergence' hypothesis. Empirically, scholars found no evidence supporting this hypothesis. Greve (1996) assesses the impact of European integration on social policies and he finds upward convergence of the expenditures on social protection in 12 EU countries in the period 1980 -1993 . Cornelisse and Goudswaard (2002 find not only an upward convergence in social benefit expenditures, but also in gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits. Their study shows that EU countries as well as non-EU OECD countries converged between 1960 and 1980, but that between 1980 and 1999 only the EU countries converged. Goudswaard and Caminada (2006) All in all, although many qualitative guided researchers favour arguments that show continuing national diversity (Pierson, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001; Daguerre and Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Hvinden, 2004; Martinsen, 2005) , the overall result of quantitative studies seems to be that there is convergence in social expenditures across European countries over the last 25 years.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Expenditure indicators
Most comparative and convergence studies of social protection use social expenditures as a measure of the level of social protection in different countries. We use data from the most recent OECD Social Expenditure Database (2007b). This database contains aggregate and disaggregated data on social expenditures. The main social policy areas included are old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, health, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment, housing and some others. Both cash benefits and benefits in kind are included. In this study we will perform convergence tests both at the aggregate level and at the programme level. At the aggregate level, the social expenditure indicator has its limitations (Kühner, 2007) . Changes in expenditure ratio's may not be caused by policy changes, but simply by the number of beneficiaries as a result of an ageing population or changes in unemployment levels due to cyclical factors. For this reason, we will control for cyclical and demographic factors. When the data are controlled for cyclical and demographic effects, it seems more plausible that patterns of convergence can be attributed to policy changes which are influenced by processes of economic integration or Social Europe. However, several methods to 'standardize' total social expenditures to control for changes in welfare demand (the number of beneficiaries) are criticized because of bias. 2 An attractive method put forward in the literature by Kühner (2007: 16 ) is simply to include independent variables measuring the unemployment rate (for cyclical factors) and the ratio of the elderly population (for old age pensions) in respective regression estimations to control for cyclical and demographic factors.
To indicate whether it is Europeanization rather than globalization that has had any impact on the convergence of social expenditures, we include not only EU member states, but also other OECD countries. These non-EU OECD countries control for the effects of globalization.
Other problems with social expenditure as an indicator for differences in social protection across countries are related to differences in the public/private mix in the provision of social protection and differences in tax features. Adema (2001) has developed indicators that aim to measure what part of an economy's domestic production recipients of social benefits really draw on -net total social expenditure. This requires capturing private social benefits and the impact of tax systems on social effort. For private programmes to be considered 'social', they need to have a social purpose and contain an element of interpersonal redistribution. The impact of the tax system on the social effort is threefold. In some countries cash benefits are taxable as a rule, in other countries they are not.
In the former countries net social effort is less than suggested by gross spending indicators. Indirect taxation of consumption by benefit recipients is another factor that may blur the picture. When indirect taxes are higher, benefit recipients have less effective purchasing power. And thirdly, the tax system can be used for social purposes. Tax deductions (for example, family tax allowances) replace direct expenditures in some cases. The Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States is a good example of a tax break, which has the features of a social protection programme. To control for the impact of tax systems on social spending, we will use the OECD data on net social expenditure. Unfortunately, these data only cover a relatively short time period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and are not available for all EU member states.
Generosity and poverty indicators
Several comparative studies of social security systems have turned to the use of replacement rates as measures of the level of benefits in different countries and therefore of the degree of social protection offered by different welfare systems (Caminada and Goudswaard, 2001 and 2002) . However, replacement rates can also only be seen as limited indicators of the generosity of benefit systems (Whiteford, 1995) . Some of the limitations are: (1) replacement rates are based on entitlement rules and often represent only the maximum payment available in the circumstances specified; (2) benefits are often not fully indexed, implying that benefits represent a decreasing percentage of wages; (3) not all relevant benefits may be reckoned with (such as housing subsidies or health care); and (4) taxation can blur the picture. To monitor social policy developments, one should ideally calculate a variety of replacement rates (differentiated by, for example, earnings levels, family situations and duration of spells). The basic approach adopted by the OECD to measure replacement rates is to compute the total benefit payable in a year of unemployment for a variety of 'typical' worker and household cases (for example, OECD, 2002 OECD, , 2004 OECD, , 2006 . We use the mean of these gross replacement rates, which is taken to represent a summary measure of benefit entitlements.
The OECD also calculates net replacement rates. Unfortunately, these data are only available for a few data years (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , so we cannot use them for our time series analysis. But we do have another time series of net replacement rates, based on Cantillon et al. (2004) . They calculated replacement rates for the basic social benefits: net social assistance benefits, as a proportion of average earnings. 4 These figures, available for the period 1992-2001, give a good indication of the generosity of the welfare systems at the minimum level in different countries.
Next, we use an important EU indicator for social cohesion: the at-risk-ofpoverty rate after social transfers. This rate is defined as the share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 percent of the national median equivalised disposable income. For this indicator Eurostat data are available for the period 1995-2006, but not for all member states. This poverty rate reflects the extent to which welfare states offer protection against poverty, although obviously poverty rates are also influenced by other factors than welfare state programmes. Finally, for a further comparison, we will also use the OECD poverty indicators: the poverty rate and the poverty gap. The OECD poverty rate is defined as the proportion of individuals with equivalised disposable income less than 50 percent of the median income. The poverty gap is the percentage difference between the average income of the poor and the 50 percent of median income poverty threshold. These OECD poverty data are available from the mid-1980's until the mid-2000s.
σ-and β-convergence tests One of the most simple methods for estimating convergence of social protection levels is using the standard deviation as a statistical yardstick (σ-convergence). With this method it is possible to examine how the dispersion between social protection levels, or other social indicators, has changed. A property of the standard deviation is that its value rises with the average value of the data set to which it is applied. To account for this, we also use the so-called coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the value of the mean of the corresponding data set. Cornelisse and Goudswaard (2002) apply the term relative convergence (divergence) when observing a drop (rise) in the value of the coefficient of variation and the term absolute convergence (divergence) when using the standard deviation as criterion.
We also employ β-convergence tests. β-convergence implies that convergence occurs when the regions with lower social protection levels tend to record a greater rate of growth in social protection. 5 In other words, the relatively backward regions tend to catch up with the relatively advanced regions on the indicator of interest.
It should be noted that β-convergence has a twofold connotation, absolute and conditional convergence. 6 The absolute convergence hypothesis is usually tested for homogeneous groups of economies such as the EU, where characteristics such as preferences and institutions are relatively similar. Therefore, we employ the absolute convergence hypothesis. We test β-convergence on social 5 Usually, the concept of β-convergence refers to the speed at which the income per capita of a poor region approaches the level of a rich one. The 'economic convergence literature' is typified by the seminal papers of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992 and 1995) , exploring β-convergence. See also Sala-i-Martin (1996a and 1996b) survey on this literature, and Quah (1993, 1996a, and 1996b ) for criticism. 6 The former implies that the process of convergence can be observed regardless of other socio-economic characteristics of the regions that are compared. The observed process is defined 'conditional convergence' in case convergence is observed holding constant a number of other 'conditioning' variables; see Quah (1996b) and Sala-i-Martin (1996b) .
protection levels as follows. In line with the work of Sala-i-Martin (1996a and 1996b), we linearly regress the annual growth rate of several social protection indicators on the initial level of the social protection indicator at the beginning of the period. The coefficient for absolute β-convergence is estimated using an ordinary least square regression model of cross-sectional data. If the coefficient β is negative (positive), we say that there is absolute convergence (divergence) in social protection levels across countries. The higher the value of β, the faster the social protection indicator in the poor region converges toward the level of the rich one. The hypothesis to test is that coefficient β is negative. 7 7 β-convergence is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for σ-convergence (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996a and 1996b) . 
RESULTS
Gross public social expenditure
Social policy areas
We also show social expenditures on the various programmes; see Figure 2 .1 and Table A2 .1 in the appendix. Expenditures on most social security functions have increased quite smoothly, except disability and survivors benefits. Expenditures on public old age pensions show a rather strong divergence from 1980 to 2003. Apparently, governments respond in different ways to the common problems of ageing of populations. However, expenditures on health care, which are also related to ageing of populations, have converged over the last two decades. Also for other functions a convergence tendency can be observed. Expenditures on active labor market programmes and on unemployment, both related to labor market developments, converged rather strongly. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 We also estimated β-convergence of public social expenditure. This is done by regressing the annual growth of gross public social expenditure as percentage of GDP on the initial level of social spending as percentage of GDP. The results, which are presented in Table 2 Germany (1985 ), New Zealand (1985 and Switzerland (1985) : OECD Labour Force Survey; and own calculations.
Control for cyclical and demographic effects
As discussed before, convergence of social expenditure ratio's may simply be caused by the number of beneficiaries as the result of ageing of the population or changes in unemployment levels due to cyclical factors, rather than by globalization or Europeanization. To control for these factors, we again estimate β-convergence of gross public social expenditure by regressing the annual change of gross public social expenditures on the initial level of gross public social expenditures (1985) , the annual change of the unemployment rate (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) and the annual change of the percentage of population aged 65 and above (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
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The estimations are presented in Table 2 .3. In the second column we see that although we controlled for cyclical and demographic effects, we still find a pretty good fit of β-convergence. Note that the coefficient of changes in the unemployment rate -as a proxy for cyclical factors -is significant, but the effect of the percentage of population aged 65 and above does not significantly differ from 0. This means that parallel developments in the unemployment rate across countries partly explain the growth in social spending, while the ageing of populations, in contrary to what usually is assumed in the literature (Castles, 2004; Kühner, 2007) , cannot. These results are in line with the results of our analysis of the individual social protection programs as presented above, which show a strong convergence of unemployment benefits, and divergence of public old-age pensions. Table 2 Table 2 .4. The countries also show a substantial divergence of expenditures. This surprising result can partly be explained by the fact that the Mediterranean welfare states are not included. Interestingly, the net social expenditures of the Scandinavian countries decreased sharply.
Net total spending
Replacement rates
Compared to expenditure data, replacement rates are a better indicator of the generosity of welfare systems, although certainly not a perfect indicator. Table  2 .5 shows that gross replacement rates of unemployment benefits increased on average by 4.9 points in the EU in the period . The figures indicate a quite strong σ-convergence of gross replacement rates, both relatively and absolutely, more within the EU than in the OECD. Between 1981 and 2005 the standard deviation of gross replacement rates of EU countries declined by 35 percent, while the coefficient of variation showed a decrease by 45 percent. Again, especially the Mediterranean countries, with rather low levels of protection in 1981, caught up rapidly in terms of gross replacement rates. Denmark and the Netherlands, the two countries with the highest replacement rates in 1981, show the sharpest decreases, which partly explains the trend of convergence. The upward convergence of replacement rates means that the upward convergence of public social expenditure on unemployment (see Table  A2 .1) not only depends on the number of unemployed people, but is also related to the level of protection for each unemployed individual. Also our β-convergence test implies that convergence occurs (see Table 2 .6).
The coefficient for absolute β-convergence indicates a significant convergence of 2 percent per year during the period 1981-2005. In Table 2 .7 we show net replacement rates of social assistance benefits. Perhaps surprisingly, welfare benefits have declined rather substantially in a number of countries: Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Also average welfare benefits have fallen between 1992 and 2001. The data on the computed average of the net replacement rates of social assistance benefits do not show a σ-convergence. Note: A simple average of replacement rates is taken to represent a summary measure of benefit entitlements. In all cases benefit entitlements have been estimated for two earnings levels (average earnings and two-thirds of average earnings of an Average Production Worker), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and three durations of unemployment spells (one year, 2 to 3 years, 4 to 5 years out of work). The columns show the unweigthed averages of these replacement rates. The computations assume standard circumstances such as 40 years of age, involuntary loss of the former job, long previous work record. etc. For further details, see OECD (1994) . Pre-2003 data have been revised.
Source: Tax-Benefit Models, OECD (2010b).
Poverty rates
Finally, we investigated trends in several poverty indicators; the poverty rate and the poverty gap. Computed average: unweigthed averages of the presented replacement rates for active couples, lone parents with 2 children, senior couples and senior lone parents.
Mean (9): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Source: Cantillon et al. (2004: 33) ; and authors' own calculations.
Next, we also include several non-EU-15 countries into our analysis to indicate whether it is Europeanisation rather than globalisation that has had any impact on the convergence of poverty rates. We use the OECD definition of poverty (threshold of 50 percent of median income). Poverty rates in the EU show a rather substantial increase from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s (Table 2 .9). From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s the unweigted average of poverty rates across OECD countries increased by 0.6 percentage point. In the decade from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s poverty rates increased again on average by 0.6 point to almost 11 percent of the population. Over the entire period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, poverty increased in most of the OECD countries. Across the OECD countries for which data are available, the cumulative increase was around 1.1 points. Also, we find a convergence of poverty rates in EU countries: both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation have fallen during this period. After including a number of other OECD countries, we find the same pattern: on average higher poverty rates, but a convergence trend. So, the OECD data on poverty rates do not show evidence for the theory of Europeanisation.
The poverty gap on the other hand has on average been reduced in the EU from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s. The reduction of the poverty gap has been smaller in OECD countries outside the EU. Also, we find convergence -more in the EU-15 than in the OECD group of countries -which is in line with our hypothesis that Europeanization has led to convergence, at least at a constant level; see Table 2 .9. As far as poverty is concerned, our data show mixed results. Both poverty rates and poverty gaps clearly converged since the mid-1980s; however, the levels of both indicators have developed in the opposite direction (see OECD, 2008: 129) . 
CONCLUSION
Convergence of social protection systems may occur both as a consequence of the implementation of EU social policies and Europeanization mechanisms and as a consequence of economic integration. Theoretically, however, economic integration may be beneficial or harmful to social protection systems. The former theory says that economic convergence will be followed by social convergence, while the latter theory says that policy competition and migration flows will put social protection systems under increased pressure, resulting in a social race to the bottom. Thus, empirical research should shed some light on the actual patterns of social protection. Earlier research concluded that social protection levels in the EU have shown a pattern of convergence to higher levels since the early 1980s. The convergence of EU welfare states has been stronger than in other OECD countries, indicating a specific EU trend. No empirical evidence for a race to the bottom has been found. However, the welfare state indicators used in earlier studies are difficult to compare across countries and entail various problems. In this article we have done several σ-and β-convergence tests with the most recent data, using a variety of indicators of social protection: social expenditures, both at the macro and at the programme level, also corrected for the impact of the tax system and for private social arrangements, replacement rates of unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits and three poverty indicators. Together, these indicators should provide a broader picture of the evolution of social protection. Our results are less clear cut than earlier findings. We still find a quite strong convergence of social expenditure in EU countries over a longer period (not caused by cyclical or demographic factors). However, this trend seems to have stagnated in more recent years, possibly under the influence of welfare state reforms. For net total social expenditure (public and private), we even find divergence since 1995 for nine EU member states for which these data are available. Replacement rates of unemployment benefits clearly converged to a higher level, but net social assistance benefits have fallen in several countries since 1992 and do not show convergence. As far as poverty is concerned, our data show dissimilar results. Both poverty rates and poverty gaps clearly converged since the mid-1980s; however, the levels of both indicators have developed in the opposite direction. Only poverty gaps converged to a lower level, which is in line with our hypothesis.
So our analysis provides rather mixed evidence on social convergence, especially for recent years. It is too early to conclude that a trend to lower protection levels and higher poverty rates has started. But our results do suggest that recent EU initiatives regarding social protection and inclusion are not very effective yet. 
